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INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW1 
PROF. DR. SOMPONG SUCHARITKUL 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The title of this address: “International Law as Law,” appears at first 
sight to beg several fundamental questions.  To discuss “international 
law” qua “law” initially requires a common understanding of the term 
“law,” or to be more precise what is meant by “law” for the purpose of 
the current study.  Without embarking on the perennial quest for a 
universal definition of “law,” it may suffice for practical purposes to 
refer even superficially to the variety of schools of thought on the 
definition of “law.”  The term “law” cannot be taken for granted, as there 
are so many known definitions of “law” in the study of jurisprudence, or 
the philosophy of law, legal science or general principles of law.  Once it 
is agreed as to which definition of “law” or which school of 
jurisprudence is adopted or to be followed, for the present purpose, the 
answer to the question whether international law is, or can at all be 
regarded as “law” may be attempted more meaningfully. This may well 
depend, as it surely does depend, on the actual definition of “law,” 
employed in the exercise. 
By way of illustration, some of the more notable schools of jurisprudence 
offering concrete definitions of “law” may be considered, as they may 
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provide different answers to the question of the “lawness” of 
international law as law. 
One of the most prominent analytical schools of jurisprudence that 
attracted the attention of jurists in the past one hundred years or so was 
the Austinian theory of law, defining ‘law” as a “command” issued by 
one political superior to a political inferior or subordinate, with a 
sanction attached in the event of failure to obey or abide by the 
“command.”2   This command theory of Austin’s definition of law was 
prevalent for some time, until discredited by a number of convincing 
objections and reasons given by subsequent commentators.  While the 
Austinian definition of “law” was in vogue, it was relatively certain that 
“international law” did not and could not qualify as “law.” 
For one thing, “international law” could scarcely be regarded as a 
command, nor could there be a political hierarchy, neither a political 
superior nor subordinate, as States are equal in the eyes of international 
law. Besides, there seemed to be a marked absence of sanction in 
international law to the extent that “international law” appeared 
outwardly to lack lawness without any effective sanction. 
In this particular context, circumstances may have considerably, if not 
fundamentally, changed over the past one hundred years.  A “command” 
that used to be the source of authority from a political superior, issued to 
a subordinate from an Austinian perspective, may find more comparable 
concrete examples in a variety of resolutions of the Security Council of 
the United Nations which could create binding legal obligations on 
member states of the United Nations.  While states remain equal in the 
eyes of international law, international bodies or agencies have been 
established which appear to have been vested with superior, if not supra-
national, authority.  It is no longer absolutely certain that if Austin were 
alive today, he could not have defended his definition of law as not 
precluding the “lawness” of international law, as a source of international 
obligations flowing from a supra-national world body, entrusted with the 
exercise of some semblance of a kind of legislative, executive and even 
judicial power with some tangible forms of sanction attached in the 
eventuality of non-compliance.  Even enforcement measures are no 
longer inconceivable within the framework of the United Nations. 
  
 2. See, e.g., John Austin and W. Jethro Brown, The Austinian Theory of Law: Being an 
Edition of Lectures I, V, and VI of Austin’s “Jurisprudence” and of Austin’s “Essay on the Uses of 
the Study of Jurisprudence”with Critical Notes and Excursus, John Murray, Albemarle Street, 
London, 1906,  p 331. 
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“International law” appears more likely to be considered as “law” in the 
eyes of other schools of jurisprudence such as the historical or 
sociological school.  Examples of relevant schools of jurisprudence 
include Sir Henry Maine’s “Ancient Law,’ Sir Paul Vinogradorff’s 
“Historical Jurisprudence,” or the Realist School of Jurisprudence.  
Additional schools of jurisprudence include the Pure Science Theory of 
Law as proposed by Professor Hans Kelsen, or the Natural Law school of 
jurisprudence prevalent in ancient Rome as reported by Classical Roman 
Jurists like Ulpian and subsequently advocated by European jurists such 
as Duguit.  Other than the analytical school of Austin, “international 
law” has incurred no negative reception in any definition of “law.” 
Even in other analytical schools of jurisprudence, the lawness of 
international law seems apparent.  Take for example, an analytical 
definition of “law,” suggested by Dr. Arthur Goodhart, Master of 
University College, Oxford University, Professor of Jurisprudence, an 
American graduate of Yale University School of Law, and for longer 
than three decades, Editor in Chief of the English Law Quarterly Review.  
In one of his memorable classes on jurisprudence almost six decades ago, 
Dr. Goodhart once offered a more pragmatic definition of “law” from his 
own school of thought, which could well be classified as “analytical”.  
According to Professor Goodhart, “law” can be defined as “a body of 
rules recognized as binding within an organized society.”3  His 
description of law as a collection or body of rules is readily and clearly 
visible.  His reference to the subjective element of “recognition as 
binding” signifies acceptance by members of the organized society as an 
obligation incumbent upon its members, as well as upon the society 
itself.  The substance of the law or any rule of law may be altered by the 
will of the society and its members, as the law itself as well as its rules 
must necessarily grow and progressively develop to keep up with the 
march of time.  Similar to the mundane Buddhist philosophy which 
manifestly admits the existence of the four fundamental truths, or the 
four Ariya Sajja, namely birth, growth, illness or decay, and death or 
disappearance, as the cycle of Samsara, any rule of law in any organized 
society is bound to follow this inevitable cycle. A rule of law is born, 
created or established; it is accepted in a society and grows or prospers in 
its application. One day it will lose its attraction and binding character by 
ailing, becoming sick, or falling into a state of decay, and will eventually 
fade away or fall into desuetude, thereby following the cycle of Samsara. 
Such rules of law which are no longer recognized by the community as 
  
 3. See, e.g., A.L. Goodhart, English Law and the Moral Law, Fred B. Rothman & Co. 
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binding will become obsolete or extinct, abrogated, superseded or 
abandoned or otherwise replaced by different, more current, or even 
contrary rules. A set of pre-existing rules may become obsolescent for 
lack of sustained recognition or continuing practice and observance.  It 
may then remain on the decline and finally fall into disuse or oblivion, or 
otherwise is substituted by another more updated and contemporary 
version of the derelict set of rules.  Such is the cycle of life and death for 
any living breathing being, including any rule of law. 
If international law is law as it appears to have been firmly established, 
then international law qua law too must follow the same path of Samsara 
as law. This accounts for the natural growth and progressive 
development of international law.  Accordingly, a rule of international 
law, just like any rule of law, comes into being or becomes established in 
the practice of states, further develops and grows in its acceptance by the 
international community, and may one day lose its attraction or binding 
force and fall out of practice and become no longer observed by states.  It 
may thus die a natural death or fall into disuse or become replaced by a 
different rule of international law. 
II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW                                          
AND NATIONAL LAWS 
Once the lawness of international law is ascertained and proven beyond 
dispute, the next series of burning questions to address and examine in-
depth concern the relationship between international law, the 
international legal system and national laws, or any given national, 
internal or domestic legal system.  One question that deserves to be 
clarified in the first place is whether international law is part of national 
law or vice versa.  To put it differently, it is questionable whether the 
international legal system finds its place in any given national legal 
system, or conversely whether a domestic legal system can be distinctly 
recognized by or within the world legal order.  The answers to these 
questions may all be in the affirmative.  Still, further questions need to be 
raised and examined regarding the reciprocal relations between the two 
legal systems. 
It may be appropriate at this point to refer to two different approaches to 
the relationship between the law of nations on the one hand and any 
given national or federal legal system on the other.  In this connection, it 
would seem practical to start from a given national legal system, such as 
the United Kingdom or the United States, to discover the proper place of 
international law within a domestic or municipal legal system.  Students 
of international law in a common law system are likely to be familiar 
4
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with the dictum of Lord Mansfield in Triquet v. Bath, (1764) 3 Burr. 
1478, recalling observations by Lord Talbot, the Lord Chancellor in an 
earlier case of Buvot v. Barbuit, (1735-37) Cas. Temp. Talbot 281-283, 
declining jurisdiction against Barbuit, who was commissioned by the 
King of Prussia in 1717 to do and execute what his Prussian Majesty 
should think fit with regard to his subjects trading in England.  Thus, the 
theory of incorporation was introduced into English case law by English 
courts incorporating customary rules of international law into the 
common law, and supplemented in the field of diplomatic immunities by 
the Statute of Anne (1708), Act for Preserving the Privileges of 
Ambassadors, and other Public Ministers of Foreign Princes and States, 
c.12, ss.1, 2 and 3.   As the United States inherited the English common 
law system upon attaining independence, the English doctrine of 
incorporation was part and parcel of the heritage of the English common 
law, complete with an incorporated body of customary rules of 
international law.  
In another closely related field of state immunity which in the English 
practice was but a sequence of personal immunity of the sovereign, in De 
Haber v. The Queen of Portugal, (1851) 17 Q.B. 171, Lord Campbell 
C.J. said, at page 206-207, “ . . . To cite a foreign potentate in a 
municipal court, for any complaint against him in his public capacity, is 
contrary to the law of nations, and an insult which he is entitled to 
resent.”  In US practice, influenced in no small measure by the common 
law doctrine of the immunity of the domestic sovereign and the impact of 
the United States Constitution, American courts were the first, in point of 
time, to formulate the doctrine of state immunity which has subsequently 
been accepted in the general practice of states.  The principle was earlier 
lucidly enunciated by Marshall C.J. in The Schooner Exchange v. 
M’Faddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812) 7 Cranch 116, at pages 136-137, “… This 
perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and this 
common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse, and an exchange 
of good offices with each other have given rise to a class of cases in 
which every sovereign is understood to waive the exercise of a part of 
that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated to 
be the attribute of every nation.”  Like in the practice of the United 
Kingdom, customary rules of international law have been accepted by 
American courts as being part of the law of “our land.” 
Other national jurisdictions which have not adopted the Anglo-American 
doctrine of incorporation of customary rules of international law as part 
of the corpus juris of their own national law may nevertheless recognize 
the existence of a body of customary rules of international law, and 
consider them, as in the case of Dutch courts, to be binding on their 
11
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national judiciary.  Other jurisdictions, such as the French and the Italian, 
may have more or less explicitly provided for the application of 
customary rules and principles of international law by national judicial 
authorities. 
To explore all the jurisdictions in the world is to enter another field of 
international legal studies, namely comparative law.  An in-depth 
examination of comparative legal systems or the comparison of national 
laws may lead inevitably to the question of choice of law in a given 
situation.  This will in turn lead to concurrent or partly overlapping areas 
of legal studies, known as conflict of laws or more popularly in the civil-
law jurisdictions, “Private International Law.” 
From the perspective of international law or the world legal order, an 
exploration of national legal systems is not only recommended but is also 
beneficial and useful.  To say the least, an examination of the laws of 
each nation or several major nations of the world, will contribute to the 
understanding of the process of the making of international law.  The 
sources of international law, as contained in Article 38 (1), (b), (c) and 
(d) of the 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice, invariably 
and expressly include references to national legal systems, such as “(b) 
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law,” 
“(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,” or 
“(d) . . . judicial decisions . . . of the various nations, as subsidiary means 
for the  determination of rules of law.”  Each of these items is found in 
the study of national legal systems. 
Whatever the ultimate conclusion that may be reached regarding the 
degree of usefulness of the studies of various municipal legal systems in 
the search for the substance of rules of international law, there is a clear 
need to learn about national laws to assist in the comprehension and 
application of rules of international law.  The intimate relationship 
between international law and national or domestic laws are therefore 
boundless and infinite.  Their inter-connection is complex and intense to 
such an extent that there seems to be very little difference in practice 
between “monism” and “dualism,” nor indeed between the different 
theories of “monism” or “dualism.” Whether international law and any 
given national law can be seen as one or can co-exist peacefully as 
distinct legal systems, appears to entail no significant or any material 
difference in effect.  Their intellectual discussion is nonetheless helpful 
for a better and wider appreciation of their mutual needs and reciprocal 
interchanges.   
6
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 16 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol16/iss1/5
2010] INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW 7 
III. IMPACT OF NATIONAL LAWS ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 
As a natural consequence of an intensive mutual relationship, 
international law has been inspired by national laws and has continued 
progressively to develop from the practice of states. Hence from the 
experience of national courts and national legal systems, including the 
legislative and administrative authorities.  International law cannot exist 
without the international community or the family of nations.  Within 
each State there is a national legal system to provide the source of 
inspiration for the livelihood of the law of nations, which continues to 
grow from strength to strength, borrowing freely from national legal 
systems whatever rule of law or general principle of law that may be 
considered expedient and conducive to its growing status in dimension as 
well as in volume and efficacy, including more effective implementation 
of the evolving rules of international law. 
Today the world has seen in active operation many international and 
regional bodies at work singly and collectively in close collaboration to 
enhance and strengthen the rules of international law.  To mention a few, 
apart from the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration in Hague which have been operative for many decades, there 
are also in operation the United Nations Compensation Commission 
(UNCC), the International Law Commission (ILC), the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), the various International and Regional Criminal 
Tribunals, and the GATT and the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
There are a great many fascinating world bodies and regional agencies to 
study in order to acquire a better understanding of international law in 
full progressive development. 
For all these and more, there is ample proof of the presence of 
international law as law.  International law has indeed become more 
effective to such an extent that it is now clearly possible to speak of 
effective remedies and the application of enforcement measures in the 
form of sanctions in international relations.  International law has been 
reinforced by the collective will of the states as manifested in various 
domains.  For instance, in the field of recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards, adherence to the New York Convention of 1958 
has done much to lend more meaningful strength to alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) in general and international arbitration in particular.  If 
international law itself is short of effective sanctions for want of an 
international police force, this gap is more than fully compensated by the 
willingness of enlightened national judicial authorities to give effect to 
international awards and adjudications. 
12
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Finally, international law has persisted, and will continue to prosper with 
the continued and increasing support of member nations of the 
international community who are currently enlightened by the realization 
that a lawless world would imply an early termination of the world legal 
order.  Only international law and order will ensure the survival of 
mankind against the background of scientific and nuclear research and 
experiments that continue to threaten the stability and well-being of the 
people of the world.  What is urgently needed today is the awareness that 
international law is law and must be regarded as such by the international 
community and by each and every member of the world populace 
without exception.  If this address has led to that conclusion, the aims 
and purposes of the present exercise may be said to have been fulfilled. 
IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
In the ultimate analysis, it is emphatically vital to reconfirm with 
absolute conviction the original proposition that international law is law, 
and that international law should be treated as law with all the attributes 
of that notion.  It is incumbent upon nations and people of the world to 
add further strength and vitality to the rules of international law without 
detracting from its lawfulness or legality.  International law should be 
devoid of the slightest trace of unlawfulness or illegality of any kind 
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